Beyond the Creative City – Cultural Policy in an age of scarcity


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The Creative City is not just an idea or theory, but has become a symbolic marker of a now defunct era of economic optimism. Throughout this era, ‘creativity’ held out the promise of radical change, and was ubiquitous. The actual ‘Creative City’ idea emerged in strength the mid-1990s as a kind of avant-garde cultural policy. Framed by a growing political investment in urban regeneration in the UK, it aimed for its wholesale policy re-orientation – with the arts, public art and urban design as symbolic leaders in a new city ‘creative turn’. The avant-garde thrust of the Creative City idea was in the promise of a cognitive as well as philosophical alternative to the development of the neo-liberal city after the collapse of modernist urban paradigms in the 1970s. ‘Creative’ would be a way of turning art into life – a new way of thinking, as well as a modus operandi of policy makers, urban planners, city officials, and even industrialists. The artist would displace the engineer as the model of professional labour in the hard physical contexts of the urban realm.

Initiated by Charles Landry and Comedia in the 1980s, the Creative City addressed the way that art and culture in cities were by and large either detached or decorative. Despite the evident cultural dimension of many a city’s social problems, a broad conceptual understanding of culture was simply missing from urban policy frameworks. And despite the evident achievement of the arts, the arts were only ever presented as an ‘add on’, like the family silver or Queen’s jewels, valuable but useless and an object of preservation more than serious thought. The Creative City idea was articulated by Landry and colleagues in a policy-friendly language, with lots of practical tips on how policymakers can provide the strategic conditions for transforming urban environments. However, creativity as defined by Landry all too easily became just a series of policy techniques (he himself referred to it as a ‘toolkit’), and was not sufficiently politicized. It traded only on its impact value. It is my argument in this paper that ‘art and culture’ need to be redefined politically, as an essential dimension of city governance. This is not something that can be fully explained here, in part as the very concept of ‘city governance’ is an ambiguous and contested. And Moreover, we need to be clear what the issues are – which is what I hope to do here, through a recap of the recent history of cultural policy.

Discussions of the creative city in cultural policy circles tend to be
framed by ‘urban regeneration’, the term though which almost all major European urban development is articulated. For us, I want us to remain with the concept of ‘the city’ and not ‘urban regeneration’ per se, for two reasons. First, ‘the city’ posits a relation between actual physically delimited territory and political legitimacy. Urban regeneration, rather, is a ‘scheme’ based mechanism, often eliding the socio-political particularity of any given urban expanse. Driven by so many priorities, multiple policy initiatives, stakeholders and vested interests, urban regeneration emerged from a confluence of civic, local, regional and national actors (all transfixed by the growing potential of transnational capital investment and global cultural tourism). For example, in the UK the profligate expenditure of ‘PFI’ projects [the Private Finance Initiative, a dimension of the ‘Private Public Partnership’ schemes initially set up by the Conservative administration in 1992], is only just fully coming to light.4 Urban regeneration then, essentially detached from the question of governance and the political commitments it entails, can and has generated a crisis of political legitimacy in urban development.

A second point worth making is that in the last two decades local authority (i.e. city council) expenditure on art and culture has far exceeded that of the national funding agencies and quangos (from Arts Council England downwards). This comes as a surprise to many, who when thinking of art or culture immediately refer to either the ‘art world’ (international art markets and art patronage) or national government funding bodies. City authorities are in fact the prime spenders on culture (though admittedly, this spending is often integral to a lot of other services, and thus is difficult to quantify in a comparative assessment). The role of the city in urban development therefore raises specific questions about the relation between producers (like artists), consumers (or citizens) and the policy mechanisms that regulate that relation. The ‘art world’ and its national sponsors are once-removed from ‘the city’, whose economic life and intellectual discourse are not embedded within it – however much they benefit from its cultural facilities, platforms or locations. The city is the place in our cultural landscape where political commitment and strategic values are consolidated, and the function of culture in civic life registered most clearly on the richter-scale of public-political deliberations. Most of our major sites, facilities and platforms for art and culture reside within the urban policy-governed expanse of the city, if used by forms of art and culture which have little intrinsic political investment in it.

From the late-1980s, an otherwise disinterested artworld did find a measure of strategic engagement with city development through urban regeneration. This was consolidated in the 1990s, where the easy availability of capital funding fuelled a massive surge in urban ambition within city council sponsors and their private real estate partners. Urban regeneration ‘partnered’ with culture, and in doing so became much more than just a strategic urban planning mechanism. Regeneration became a broad cultural framework. By capitalising on the ideological appeal of culture, it evoked the Victorian values of heritage and patrimony, which in turn allowed it to
represent its property and land re-appropriation activities as some kind of civic renaissance. By the end of the decade, regeneration became a broad philosophy of urban transformation, inspiring artists, urban designers, visionary architects and social entrepreneurs. It became a framework within which ideas were generated, design was formulated, and significant research was conducted: urban regeneration was a conceptual arena for rationalizing the function, value and benefits of a whole range of economic, social and cultural activities in urban space (and the relation between them). However, as indicated above, its lack of a specific fulcrum of political commitment meant that urban regeneration was sufficiently amorphous to be able to repeatedly mask, conceal or re-present (in politically persuasive imagery) a range of socially unacceptable mechanisms for the control and appropriation of public assets.5

With the current decline of massive capital investment and free-flow cash, the urban regeneration as we know it will also decline (and already has, though currently we live in the nether world of contractual obligations, where funds committed five years ago are only now being spent). One of the products of the last two decades of regeneration was public art – where every city centre was to a greater or lesser degree host to new sculptures, installations, performances and cultural festivals, new monuments and commemorations, and large art-architecture collaborations. Each type of public art has its own order of value, and in our era of scarcity will fare differently. Revenue-raising arts, like popular performance and festivals, might well expand; otherwise, we will no doubt see a contraction of artistic activity, as well as a ‘retraction’ of artistic labour back into the established silos of art institutes and contemporary museums. Public art – and its inherent concern with a cultural public sphere – should, however, be part of any serious attempt to address the creative city.

In a recessionary framework, the relation between culture and poverty is theoretically interesting for reasons I will explain in the next section. Currently, artists – probably one of the most economically resourceful and adaptable of social groups – are indeed trying to find a way of ‘doing it cheaper’, without the patronage of capital-funded frameworks. Aside from the attraction of new technology, there has been a discernible shift to the internet and to social media as preferred cultural locations. In the city, we have pop-up art shops, installations in other provisional spaces, like bankrupt business space in city shopping centres. Many artists are of course hoping for a ‘capital flight’ from the spaces of retail, to an extent that echoes the post-industrial vacation of factory space in the 1970s. However, the artist doing it on the cheap is not ‘the problematic’ of the post-creative city.

Our problematic, however, is broader – the manifest role of ‘creativity’ in the city and its mechanisms of political reproduction. Despite the extent that art and culture have been involved in urban regeneration, both national urban and cultural policy in the UK has actually prevented the ‘internalization’ of art within urban development. Cultural Policy-making in the UK has by and large taken the form of cultural economics – concerned
with the building of strategic mechanisms and rationales on funding art from national public revenue sources, predicated on the art in question remaining free of any local political obligation. The term ‘cultural policy’ has traditionally revolved around ‘the arts’ of course, and plays a double game of being ‘post-facto’ in the sense of functioning as mere ‘support’ for the good art that already exists, and yet whose power of financial patronage can only but be prescriptive. The actual role of national funding mechanisms in cultural production is still something of a mystery. Cultural policy debates within public policy circles largely revolve around cost-benefit ratios, which when fail, appeal to older philosophical (and anachronistic) concepts of the humanities in civil society or the general public good. ‘General public good’ is by its nature so diffuse it is also indefinable.

**Where’s the creative city?**

One of the animating principles of the original creative city framework was that the city itself was a creative product, and developing the city as a site, frame and platform for creativity itself required creative action – that policy making was meant to emerge from a creative intellectual engagement with the conditions and processes of cultural production. At present, after two decades of art commissioning and patronage, we certainly do have a lot of genuinely impressive creative ‘nodes’, components and events in our cities, many if not all are the product of policy initiatives. But do we have a creative city? What do we actually think of when we think of a ‘creative city’?

![Diagram 2: creative city components](image)

Many cities boast the components of a creative city, as they have featured in the growing theoretical and empirical literature on the subject
– from Charles Landry to Charles Leadbeater, from John Montgomery to Richard Florida. For Florida, in his recent book Who’s your City (2008), the ability to assess a city’s urban culture is now essential to planning one’s career trajectory! In the UK, the creative city was premised on some happy alliance between the notoriously philistine centre of urban command and control – local Town Planning – and incoming new trends in urban design (largely emerging from the American ‘placemaking’ tradition). However, surveying the available books now in the marketplace on the subject of the creative city, we do not find tales of success, but more often than not a cultural analysis of problems – problems that more often than not have arrived via the law of unintended consequences. Most of these books, of course, are written by academics (who make a living out of finding problems); nevertheless, these problems have a very concrete and undisputed reality.

These problems include gentrification and property-oriented development, with its social class segregation, and consequent ‘class cleansing’ of suburbs (family and community dispersal); add to this the phenomena of metropolitanisation, then commodification, where the city’s social mechanisms of development are redefined and redesigned according to generic measures of retail distribution, service industry labour efficiency and transportation speed. And where the city brand scheme reconstitutes the indigenous social identity of a place, making it a pliable object of strategic destination marketing, where even residents are treated like visitors. The lure of international capital invariably meant that every city high street was swiftly given over to international brands, and with the priority on luxury and consumer goods rather than local trade; indigenous craft or produce from the local economy was entirely displaced. It’s a story told many times, that where the creative city was meant to concern itself with ‘the city’, instead, creativity became a means of enabling the city to act as both platform for and cipher of the new global economy, whose interests are inimical to the long term development of existing social communities and their urban spaces. The general point is that the creative city is not sustainable, and like the global capital markets, will sooner or later collapse under the weight of its own contradictions.

And yet, anyone who remembers the 1970s would agree that British cities have radically changed for the better, and art and creativity has been a visible means of that change. Many a northern industrial town now celebrates its effaced cultural history; places like Salford or Coventry or Preston have excavated and reinterpreted forgotten history and memory. Culture has been used to galvanise community life and forge a vision for the future. There has been an explosion in café culture, new open spaces, local outdoor events, celebrations and festivals, unimaginable in the economic context of the 1970s. And despite the economic downside of tourism, British cities have been projected across the world, attracting the kind of tourists that play a legitimate role in developing cultural life (not just stimulating ‘Disneyfication’).

With some irony, perhaps, the UNESCO Creative City index only registers one UK ‘creative city’ – Bradford. (Scotland is the only country in
the world having two creative cities – Glasgow and Edinburgh). Bradford, however, is only creative on account of its investment in one single creative industry sector – film. Does this mean it is a creative city?8

The city of Toronto is the most ethnically diverse and widely recognized creative cities in the world. In this context, the opening of its impressive creative city strategy is telling: It states:

‘The Mayor’s vision of creativity as an economic engine; Richard Florida’s arrival in Toronto: two prominent indications of the importance of creativity at this moment in the city’s history. The components are all in place: Toronto’s wealth of human talent; its openness to diversity; its strong social infrastructure; the breadth and depth of higher education institutions; strong and safe neighbourhoods. And last but not least, its extraordinary strengths in creative and cultural industries. It is all here’. (Creative City Planning Framework 2008).9

It may all be there. However, the next paragraph begins: ‘But success requires political will’. The situation in the UK at present is this. Like Toronto, impressive ‘components’ and the facility to initiate, develop and manage ‘components’ have been consolidated. But something to do with ‘political will’, or political commitment, is lacking. And ‘will’ is not a simple matter of intention: there are plenty of good intentions around. ‘Will’ requires a philosophically defensible rationale. Creativity as such is not the issue either: it is everywhere. The issue is the nexus between politics and policy and what ‘culture’ can become within that nexus. Somehow our cities do not have a cultural coherence, not in vision, trajectory or lifestyle, as urban-city development itself has not been principally generated by the kind of critical research that would comprehend the political nature of urban cultural life.

**Culture and Political Will**

Where in France, preserving a sense of the French ‘way of life’ is a normative imperative for cultural policy, in the UK there is no such sense of indigenous aesthetic dimension to the everyday – at least, not beyond the inherently conservative provincial parish routines still visible around the country. One of the formative influences for Comedia’s creative city research was European cultural planning and the work of the Council of Europe from the late 1970s, from where the fashionable urban regeneration term ‘renaissance’ was derived (the European Campaign for Urban Renaissance: 1982-1986). The term ‘renaissance’ employed in New Labour cultural policy from around 1999 – in the arts, urban design and planning, and museums and heritage – signified an attempt to reconstruct a sense of a cultural way of life.10

The rhetoric of wholeness, reintegration, and even a sense of political ‘healing’ pervaded New Labour’s ‘joined up’ approach to government on accession to power in 1997. In the foreword to the Urban White Paper11 *Our Towns and Cities* (2000), John Prescott stated ‘How we live our lives is
shaped by where we live our lives’, inflecting a technical strategy for city
development with New Labour polemic. The argument was that the urban
regeneration of past governments was premised on property reconstruction,
ignoring the more fundamental issues of ‘quality of life’. The term ‘quality
of life’ followed ‘renaissance’ in policy discourse, and in the first of the
impressive The State of English Cities reports, it expressed Tony Blair’s states
aspiration to put public interest at the heart of city management through a
renewed local democracy – expressing ‘a connected rather than reductionist
view of the world’.13

The cities of Sofia, Marrakesh, Bangalore, are all cities of culture,
with profound dimensions of cultural experience and a distinctive way of
life. However, we wouldn’t call them ‘creative cities’. The historical cultural
city, however, is still a principle focus of global cultural tourism, and signifies
something of the mysterious sense in which a ‘way of life’ has been lost, and
the very nostalgia for lost culture is something which in certain respects the
creative city seeks to simulate in positive ways. And whilst the loss of singular,
organic national cultural ‘way of life’ is of course intrinsic to industrial
modernity per se, the historic city still generates something enigmatic,
where the ‘loss’ of culture is made over into a positive cultural experience.
The issue here is that this enigmatic sense of the cultural is beyond policy,
and not simply an effect of old architecture and planning. Barcelona’s El
Ravel perhaps expresses something of the social conditions of this historic
urban culture, where a nebulous social anarchy pervades the area. Closer to
home, with a more parochial example, London’s Camden Lock and its ability
to attract 150,000 young visitors on a summer’s weekend, is not an effect of
great architecture, art or musical events either. In fact, a quotidian set of mid-
nineteenth century waterways warehouses, through which operate a series
of canal locks, are the context around a main attraction in the form of a local
market. Much of the market sells unimpressive low-grade low-price domestic
ware. Yet, Camden Lock is enigmatic.

Physical facilities and material environments do not in themselves
create an enigmatic cultural dynamic. It is the way the space and place
generates form of undirected social interaction, which is hard to define in
policy terms (for example, it is where production and consumption are almost
indivisible, and where outside shifts in capital are resisted, and where endless
forms of differentiation and defamiliarisation seem possible). The social
interaction of these spaces is as much an interaction with space as with other
people, and is difficult to define without reference to past and dissolving
cultural rituals, symbolic languages, states of mind, all of which are mediated
by a profound sense of disoriented change (as El Ravel has of course changed
in response to increased visitors and outside attention, as well as the rest of
technological modernity). A range of parallel cultural spaces have emerged
in many European cities over the last few decades – sometimes initiated
by artists or squatters, sometimes private entrepreneurship, sometimes
policy initiative – all attempting to stimulate the sociocultural enigma of
authentic culture: Berlin (Tacheles), Grenoble (Quartier Berriat), Lausanne
(Flon), Marseille (Friche Belle-de-Mai), the Dortmund ‘U’, and Birmingham’s Custard Factory. To this can be added the recent rise in ‘artist-run’ galleries or arts centres. They are not one single phenomenon, but without doubt the rise in such spaces is a symbolic resistance against the normative cultural formations prescribed by established patterns of urban development.

These new cultural spaces are animated not by some neoprimitivist desire for a pre-modern unity of social collective and the environment, but a more critical grasp of the loss of culture in and against the cultural overproduction of the creative city era. These spaces did not emerge in response to a lack of culture, but a world where the shopping mall, university and city art museum had all become part of a new seamless and burgeoning flow of ‘creative capital’. In these spaces we find the ‘spectre of authenticity’, where ‘raw’, real or street level social interaction responds to the impossibility of ‘real’ culture (or a sense of what the term ‘real’ means in any available context). They all thus express a need for ‘unmanaged’ or self-managed life. This is a serious, if ignored, intellectual problem for policy. Adorno’s rail at the ‘overadministered society’ was not utopian: the micromanagement of culture can strangle the very intellectual energy it seeks to cultivate. The past and current policy mentality cannot tolerate the idea of cultural anarchy, even though what is illegal, socially degrading or ‘bad’ design often plays a productive role in urban-cultural reproduction.

The problematic we face is therefore both theoretical and practical – understanding the current conditions of cultural experience in and against the components of a creative city, which are so impressive but cannot give us a creative city. We don’t experience the city as a creative space, the creative dimensions of it are either contrived (appear and disappear without trace), or only involve a select group of specialists. What we still look for as valuable in culture is often the historically degraded, the unmanaged, the unreformed or even deformed, or the impossible or downright nihilistic. This does not mean we are looking for the right thing – we are surely not: the reflex to look for ‘real’ culture in the obsolescent ‘historic-cultural city’ is surely symptomatic of a disorientation caused by the dislocation of culture from the contemporary urban and its political conditions. Our cities import or reproduce culture, not create it (and in turn are created by it).

The Intellectual Task
Currently it seems, in the UK at least, that the growing shock of a second economic recession – which could last up to a decade – is helpfully exposing the fundamental priorities of local authorities and arts funders alike. It is also an opportunity for critical reflection on these priorities. Cultural activists may take heart in the fact that much of the pivotal moments in the history of modern art emerged in times of recession, depression, war or downright social decline. I will further our discussion by briefly considering two issues: 1: we need to re-think the cultural politics inherent in planning and design principles (and their relation to the cultural development of the city); 2: we need to re-think our very concept of culture, and how the urban and the
cultural (which still largely means the arts) are related. These are big subjects, so here I can only offer a few thoughts.

1: The policy deployment of the term ‘creativity’ has further generated a culture of administered control, and not of freedom – creativity has been yet another set of techniques for generating preconceived economic ends, and not a way of opening up new possibilities. Moreover, the ideology of creativity that animated cultural and related policy fields was still grounded in outmoded notions of inspirational individualism, articulated through style and the eccentricity of the celebrity artist or architect, a phenomena so deconstructed by Bourdieu in the 1980s and popularised by sociologists in the UK through the 1990s. This, for the critics of cultural policy, has resulted in the pseudo-aesthetics of ‘starchitecture’ and the ‘aestheticisation’ of social life in our once great cities (Miles, 2007), where luxury is the norm, displacing vernacular creativities (Edensor, et al. 2009), and where culture only counts if it is instantly converted into a ‘creative industry’ (Pratt and Jeffcut, 2009). Creativity has been central to the reconstitution of labouring subjectivities for new hypermobile and flexible neoliberal economy, as defined by geographers David Harvey, Nigel Thrift and others. Altogether, the impacts of this culturalisation of the urban have not facilitated a more active citizenry, but rather, a further detachment of the populace from the mechanisms of urban development. For culture has merely become a way of making the city more beautiful, pleasurable and attractive – not more intellectually active in the cultural politics of its urban way of life.

The disappointing aspect of New Labour’s legacy after a period of almost unprecedented political power, is not that they missed an opportunity to re-think planning and design principles and their relation to cultural development. They certainly did (admittedly more with design than planning). The disappointment is that their policy initiatives were either not followed through, or were not followed with statutory obligations for implementation at the level of local authority. How many a local planning guideline referred to design principles, design quality indicators, public art strategy for new residential estates – all immediately obviated by ever attractive small print ‘get-out clauses’. This was not oversight: it was a rank political failing, as even at the very outset, with the Labour Party’s manifesto for the 1997 general election, a commitment was made to radically reconfigure the urban environment:

‘The arts, culture and sport are central to the task of recreating the sense of community, identity and civic pride that should define our country. Yet we consistently undervalue the role of the arts and culture in helping to create a civic society’.17

Creating a new ‘civic society’ – healing the wounds of the previous instrumentalism and ‘economism’ of John Major’s Conservative administration – was the intellectual impetus behind the urban, social and community policy initiatives of 1997-2002. For an early example, the then DETR’s Planning for
Sustainable Development: Towards a Better Practice (1998) suggested that each city in the UK constructed a ‘vision’ (a visualization) of how their city should look in 25 years time. This was not simply a request for a normative urban design proposal. It was an attempt at addressing the poverty of thought and paucity of long term planning in city life – where culture, society and the built environment were considered as one ‘civic’ whole – and a new horizon of expectation was constructed through an act of civic imagination.

It was just an idea. The city did emerge as a major theme for New Labour – with continued support for the European ‘Core Cities Initiative’, started in the UK in 1995, and the ‘State of the English Cities’ project, which since 2000 has created an enormous database and series of strategic studies. These both included the arts and culture as components, yet mere components with no sense of an intrinsic strategic role. The intellectual failure in integrating culture and the urban at the level of city planning was perhaps symbolized by the Urban Task Force’s second report, Towards a Strong Urban Renaissance (2005), which so obviously lamented the lack of political will in implementing their first report and now famous urban study, Towards an Urban Renaissance (1999). A masterful text book of urban design, the first report arguably became bogged down at implementation stage in the politics of urban economics, which then obfuscated the nature of its intellectual demands. Local authorities were not visibly inspired, and the agenda soon moved on from design-led ‘renaissance’ to the new eco-economics of sustainability (which, it must be said, became surprisingly philistine).

During New Labour’s tenure, the Arts Council England continued to defend the ‘autonomy’ of the arts, but as this cut little ice in policy spheres, it invested most of its research budget into proving art’s social impact (a policy performance not without contradiction). The political heat was taken off the arts inadvertently by the work of the Government’s Creative Industries Task Force (CITF), who when conducting their Creative Industries Mapping exercises (of 1998, then 2001) slotted ‘Art and Antiques market’ within the matrix of the UK’s hard GDP production. Calculated revenue and employment rates implied that the public subsidy of the artworld was more of an investment than a subsidy. More important were the cognitive implications of subsequent policy discussions, where the arts and culture began to be defined in terms of the broader creative economy. Universally appreciated by their cousins, the designers, art directors and media producers in the creative industries, the arts were effectively positioned in the public policy mindset as a kind of ‘exploratory research’ or open source ‘R&D’. Art and the artist were no longer ‘for their own sake’ but a realm of blue-skies thinking that generated an IP-free publicly-available ‘models’ of thought, communication, production and business to be fruitfully appropriated by the design and media industries. With publications like the DEMOS sponsored The Independents: Britain’s new cultural entrepreneurs (by Leadbeater and Oakley), the tangible distinction between the artist and the business entrepreneur shrank; they were two sides of the same coin.18 Art could happily remain
the chaotic but invigorating swirl of un-implemented ideas, for it was for other parts of the economy to do the implementing. It was precisely art’s lack of concern for the world of tangible problems that stimulated its raw inspirational energy. New forms of contemporary art – such as ‘BritArt’ – added even further levels of value. Gaining an unprecedented profile in the international media, Britart was routinely feted by the political establishment for its verve and daring. In Tony Blair’s ‘Cool Britannia’ (a smug epithet that soon dissolved under the impact of the Millennium Dome fiasco in 2000), contemporary art was evidence to the international business community that Britain was a ‘live’ and kicking place to live, relocate, or to educate one’s children. Few people liked the actual products (the art) of live culture – but the implications were always more ideologically influential than the reality. Britain was a culturally great place to be.19

By 2005 and The Cox Review of Creativity in Business, the arts became an established tool in the policy mindset for creative development in all sectors of industry. And even though the ‘creative’ and ‘cultural’ were viewed by Cox as coextensive, as policy fields they were heading in very different directions.20 Little if any integration was attempted between them, and continued cultural policy advocacy for the arts developed no lexicon of urbanism, despite the growing achievements of public art.21 European cultural planning models were largely rejected by local authorities, despite the increasing use of terms like ‘cultural infrastructure’ in city councils’ cultural strategies. Further intellectual development was somewhat stalled by a wholesale serial reproduction in policy making – a ‘xerox policies’ syndrome (i.e. repeating models, such as ‘clusters’ or ‘creative quarters’) – or a concentration of cultural resources in a fixed network of high-profile (and expensive) institutions (the world of public funding has its own celebrity sub-culture).

Whilst most arts organizations in cities across the country were more than please to benefit from urban regeneration in the form of new facilities, design ‘make overs’, new projects or event funding, their role in urban development rarely venture beyond participation in routine local government ‘consultation’ exercises. The intellectual position of the arts has been fundamentally defensive and not offensive, and it’s hard to find a city where the arts sector maintains any form of ‘avant-garde’ impact on its city’s political discourses. I want to end this section with a few points about Charles Landry’s initial vision for the creative city, or rather, what I think the presuppositions of his original concept of creative city were, as these are a good preface for a rethinking of the role of art in a city-urban framework:22

(i) creativity should not be primarily a matter of art, but of urban life: the city as a cultural product is a priority.

(ii) creativity is not a moral category – [the political aesthetics of fascism put paid to that idea], as creativity can be destructive as well as productive.

(iii) creativity is not primarily or necessarily individualist and spontaneous (or about art objects or expressive style), but collective and strategic
(about spaces, behaviours, knowledge, vision).
(iv) lastly – importantly – public policy was not intended to direct or
patronise creativity, but to create the social conditions for creativity.
Cultural production should be stimulated by the urban contexts of its
emergence, not abstract policy ideas and their funding strategies.

Of course, I have ‘shoehorned’ Landry into my own argument here – yet I
think these tenets are a defensible means of impetus for a re-think of art and
the city.

2: We need therefore to re-think our conception of culture, and how the
urban and the cultural (which still largely means the arts) are related. ‘Cultural
policy’ should be the place where ‘culture’ is understood as something
formed through political decision-making and regimes of management we
call ‘cultural governance’. An immediate issue is, of course, that ‘cultural
policy’ is not a national public policy category as such: cultural policy is
either arts policy, music policy, media policy, sport policy, and so on, all
devolved into city-based local strategies (which is often just national policy
writ small). Culture is atomized into genres, each possessing its own
professional constituency and internal political dynamics. Areas of culture,
like faith groups, do not feature on the radar of cultural sector-directed
policy at all. Even thinking about culture on a national scale is structured by
its aforementioned ‘positioning’ in the creative economy. In public policy
terms, we find that we are faced with three overlapping but strategically
distinct fields – creative, cultural and urban. Sometimes these are referred to
as sectors, sometimes ‘economies’ in their own right.

DIAGRAM 1 – the three economies

The conceptual separation of these ‘economies’ or sectors (whatever
the reality of their overlapping and interconnection) is a structural feature of
British policy making, and has implications on how we think through future scenarios. My suggestion is that a new macro-urban cultural policy thinking needs to start with the dynamic between the three economies (moving beyond the categorizations instituted by the DCMS ‘mapping’).

The separation of the arts as a unique and distinct sphere may seem logical in the light of its ‘public’ subsidy, but it has implications for thinking about cultural production and the city. The role of the arts in a broader cultural policy framework is characterized by a caveat – the arts (contemporary art, etc.) by and large inhabit a cultural field and discourse that is transnational, and whose primary economic frame of reference is not any one urban environment. It is the historical-international discourse of contemporary art and its global art economy. New forms of ‘participatory art’ aside, contemporary art generally attains to ‘greatness’ (in the Arts Council’s terms) by virtue of not being embedded in the urban everyday through which social reproduction is mediated. The Arts Council England’s ongoing campaign of ‘great art for everyone’ is a last chance café, which rests on the premise that international contemporary art is socially relevant, even to ‘ordinary’ people who don’t inhabit its discourse, or have any reason to. Attempting to entice the public into the art world is not a rationally defensible objective (as perhaps the statistics of successive Arts Council ‘Taking Part’ surveys indicate). It is one of the ironies of contemporary art history – that the artworks and artists who punctuate the official narratives of twentieth century art were invariably creatures of the market, not public subsidy.

To compound the caveat – the heavy patronage of the arts within national urban regeneration over the last two decades has to some degree masked a policy-level strategic detachment from its urban environment. The Arts Councils have maintained a distinctively modernist concept of ‘autonomy’ as a policy principle (where modernist autonomy of course was embodied in the very principle of ‘arm’s length’ governance that was the Arts Council’s political modus operandi as specified in its Royal Charter). While in 1989 the Arts Council of Great Britain published An Urban Renaissance: The Role of the Arts in Urban Regeneration, (in part inspired by the then Department of Environment’s earlier ‘art and architecture’ initiatives), and then supported the US originated ‘Percent for Art’ scheme in British public sector construction, the urban realm remained marginal to their policy thinking throughout the 1990s up to the present (see A Creative Future: The Way Forward for the Arts, Crafts and Media in England).

It was left for the Department of Culture Media and Sport to make the big case for integrating art in urban contexts, with their (belated) 2004, Culture at the Heart of Regeneration. Despite the enormous development of public art practice by mid-2000, particularly after the high point of Millennium commissions, the theme of ‘regeneration’ was just one of a spectrum of Arts Council concerns, some would say deliberately downplayed and certainly overtaken by the investment of the arts in social and community services (see the 2006 review, the three-part The Power of Art). When by 2007 the
significance of public art and participatory art in the public realm became irrepressible, the Arts Council invented a new category of ‘Outdoor art’ (the theme of which was ‘public’ space, but the focus of which was transient performance-based art).29

Generally, arts-focused cultural policy became a repetitive exercise in seeking different ways to ‘insert’ art into benign social policy contexts. A more compelling demonstration of the ‘power’ of art was arguably taking place in the urban realm, with local authorities and their various stakeholders. Many high profile artists, consultants or agents and architects developed public advocacy roles during this period, articulating a broader vision on the integration of art into the city. While they were also representing their own professional interests, the intellectual discourse generated in this sphere of things was significant and new.30

My point here then is that cultural policy, being focused on the arts, became overly concerned with the economics of arts funding and blind to the economics of cultural production (which is largely embedded in cities). While to some degree this reflects the territorialisation of the policy landscape (the ‘city’ is seen as local authority responsibility and not the preserve of national arts funding bodies), there is a strong sense that vested interests alone are determining the role of art in the city and the fate of the real creative city ideal. The challenge of the Creative City framework was that it not only demanded art should be internal to the way a city plans its urban development, but that urban development itself should becomes generative of art. Conceptualising this process requires imagination, as we are currently working with a three-sphere economy of arts, culture and urban and no real strategic direction into a future other than a will to preserve and survival. Cultural policy does not have such an ‘imagination’ facility, but it needs to develop one given the possible scenarios of our developing era of scarcity.

Thinking art in Urban Spaces
It’s easy to demand that ‘policy making’ develops an intellectual imagination: but what does this mean? I can only make one major point – cultural policy needs to develop out of an engagement with cultural production itself, out of the terms developed by artists and groups working in (and against) the actual concrete conditions of civic and urban life. In what follows below I offer six examples of ‘urban-public’ art practice, from which a general point on creative policy in the city can be extrapolated.

(i) The NVA organisation’s SAGE: the ‘Grow and Sow Project’ (starting in Glasgow 2009, ongoing in various permutations): NVA is one of the UK’s major public arts and urban intervention organizations, and the SAGE project’s stated aims include transforming derelict and vacant land into visually articulated spaces through growing natural produce and micro-agricultural activity. The food is not for market as such, unless new local markets emerge around them; they seem to be primarily aimed at breaking the dichotomy of producer-consumer and is aimed at those who have no experience of growing garden produce. Framed by rising food costs and
the globalization of the supply chain – this project is a powerful way of reconstituting community, identity and leisure (i.e. patterns of consumption) around urban land, perhaps unused, reclaimed, or politically contested. It has been designed as a mobile initiative – when land is required for development, the infrastructure can move to a new site. In some ways it bears some affinity with the Guerilla Gardening initiatives, or some projects on DIY City experiments. As an idea it is hardly new, given the use of old Victorian allotments during successive world wars. Its compelling aspect is in the recolonisation of space for a local economy, whose production values could be as social as cultural as political, if or when poverty levels ‘politicize’ the food chain.

(ii) Cittadellarte – Fondazione Pistoletto – is perhaps an example on an opposite pole. The 1960s art luminary Michelangelo Pistoletto is demonstrating a new form of creative entrepreneurship. While on the face of it, the Cittadellarte seems like classic high-cost urban regeneration in a celebrity-driven mode, yet this form of artistic patronage demonstrates profound intellectual potential. Artistic patronage or any other kind of artistic leadership in the UK is virtually non-existent. Called a ‘creative laboratory’, the Cittadellarte runs courses and convenes creative research teams to apprehend major social and economic problems, forging policy initiatives through artistic practice, whether urban decay or economic sustainability. While the ‘art lab’ idea was indeed a 1990s trend, this is far more – it is an industrial size complex that challenges university-based Humanities research in its potential for high-impact knowledge creation. Where most universities have largely abandoned a direct public role for their humanities research, this offers a measure of hope, particularly as Cittadellarte’s cultural activism has given the small town of Biella both a strong regional and a national profile. This kind of active cultural citizenship requires further thought.

(iii) Mirjam Struppek’s European Urban Screens are a low cost way of creating urban networks of information, art and cultural documentary. While the express attempt at using the virtual world of plasma screens to create the conditions of a new public sphere, is of course a little idealistic. Inserted screens in key public spaces is something that is gaining pace by commercial actors –and preventing this colonization of space is an achievement in itself. Theoretically, however, the screen could play a significant role in engaging with a culturally indifferent social populace on street-level. It could demonstrates a practical way of ‘externalizing’ artworld culture, creating perhaps (in Bourdieu’s terms) a new public ‘habitus’, which goes some way to helping dissolve the enduring cultural class system. I can also provide new methods of the politicization of public space, with its effective routes for the dissemination of political information.

(iv) CM Architecten’s Agorascape project is just one of many examples of contemporary European architects who draw on architectural history’s enormous intellectual resources, designing spaces for dialogue and interaction. Like the ancient Greek agora, or open ‘place of assembly’, this project aims at purposively designating civic spaces for the purpose of
discussion and debate. In cities, the places of political deliberation are closed, and enclosed, accessible only in badly tabulated documents well after the fact. Low cost modification of the environment can generate new ways of reinstituting an agora-culture in city centres.

(v) Faith groups have largely been written out of the narrative of cultural sector policy development, but they are one of the most productive of cultural groups. Take a provincial Baptist church on the edge of Oxford: the John Bunyan Baptist Church. Churches are surprising engines of cultural production, but the interesting dimension of this church is its Ark T Centre programme. Using an adjacent building, it creates a space for artists, and the art is used as a means of both ecclesiastical reflection as well as community dialogue between the artists and residents in the area. Despite the work of The Faith Based Regeneration Network and the various Interfaith Councils, the role of faith communities in regeneration has been largely stunted; their potential for a creative community mobilization, however, is enormous if allowed to work within the terms of their own sub-culture.

(vi) Participatory art: new forms of socially-embedded art are emerging, and in ways that have long term potential for urban development. Strange Cargo in Folkestone on the South Coast is one example of an organisation with a long-term political commitment to an urban locale. They find the means to adapt their artistic production to the broader rhythms of local cultural production. Here we find artists inhabiting regional vernacular culture for long periods, speaking the visual language of the area, working at providing an alternate method of constructing cultural capital to a populace always once-removed from ‘official’ culture. Strange Cargo are no art world snobs, but will participate in vernacular creativities from fetes to winter grottos. However, within the familiar and unthreatening world of the parochial everyday, they reorder the patterns of social interaction, which enable local people to learn, think, and access the discursive forces that ultimately shape their physical environment.

(vii) My last example is the most complex: Initially commissioned as part of the European Capital of Culture 2012 – awarded to the Ruhr region of Germany – the project 2-3Strassen began in 2009 when artist Jochen Gerz advertised around Europe for 80 volunteers to occupy, free of charge, 80 apartments. Out of 1,457 applicants, 80 initially took up residence in each of the 3 streets, in Duisburg, Dortmund and Mülheim an der Ruhr (the latter is a ‘vertical street’ or towerblock and vicinity). Earmarked for ‘regeneration’, which a high immigrant population and unemployment, the ‘creatives’ were briefed on their creative terrain – in effect testing, but also working out, Richard Florida’s ‘creative class’ thesis. Each street had an internet café and office space as an organizational HQ, and all apartments containing a laptop computer connected by internet to a central database. Contributing on their laptops, the resident creatives formed the core of authors that wrote the now published 3,000 word record: 2-3Strassen (Dumont, 2011).

As a model of housing reclamation, residential enculturation and ethnic-immigrant acculturation, this art project opened up a new front for
art in the public realm. Many of the volunteers were artists or designers, many were not, and many continued to hold down their regular jobs. Together, the volunteer creatives lived in their streets from January to end of December 2010, 40 of which have remained. The objective for Gerz was to make the street a ‘living exhibition’ of art. With reference to Josef Beuys he sometimes called it ‘social art’. And as social art, it introduces a powerful sense of reorientation within a physical urban place. A year after the project’s termination, a new politics of public housing has been introduced into city policy circles.

My examples are, of course, atypical public-urban art projects, but chosen to present a spectrum of activities that need to be considered by policymakers in considering the relation between art, culture, city governance and urban development. The examples cover the active reclamation and reproduction of urban space, new intellectual centres for idea and policy development led by cultural ‘producers’, artists as facilitators of new public discourse through new media, explicit deliberations in designated city spaces, activating faith groups for dialogue of broader meaning, purpose and beliefs that motivate and provide hope, activating communities through creative participation, and addressing the chronic problem of housing in a way that generates restorative social energies. These are not unique projects, but together they give us a glimpse of the realms of urban life art could inhabit, which increased to a critical level of funding, would establish a critical mass of activity and in turn could become formative of a new city public culture. Once cultural activism reaches the level and consolidation of a truly ‘public’ cultural sphere, it then becomes political, as the ground on which it works, and the subjects through which it speaks, are replete with political interests. All our examples involve a mobilization of a public, or a process whereby art spectators are turned into cultural citizens.

**Conclusion**

My intention in this paper, with a broad brush, has been to sketch a response to the current dissolution of the creative city model of cultural policy. This was not to glory in the demise of a fanciful ideology, but to recognize its significance in our thinking of the future of public culture after the large-scale umbrella of urban regeneration. How can we understand cultural production in the urban complex of the city without the patronage of capital investment? All my examples of art projects in urban spaces are animated by ideas that contrast with the priorities of urban regeneration. The role of artists in urban regeneration was always as a junior partner, and the art always submerged in a complex of symbolic meanings articulating global economic forces always beyond view. National cultural policy as it stands is fixation on international contemporary ‘artworld art’ – of effectively evangelizing on behalf of this artworld and attempting to convert the public into art spectators. It rather needs to consider how to turn art spectators into cultural citizens, whose life in real cities can be creative and generative of the non-capital investment social investment that is the only way to develop an urban ‘way of life’. It
needs to consider the real meaning of the term ‘public culture’, and how a genuine public culture can exist as an integral part of city governance. Of course, the opportunities will be (and are being) suppressed by a new public management ethos of ‘survivalism’, a retrenchment of self-interest, and a negation of risk. In the next decade – the ‘lost decade’, as the media are calling it – the most critical issues of the life of our cities will emerge.

NOTES
2. The term Creative City was popularized by Charles Landry in the 1980s in part through his empirical research on cities like Glasgow, and his consultancy Comedia, the subsequent international conferences (Glasgow, 1994; Helsinki, 1996; Huddersfield, 2000), and current creative urban strategy-making across the world. His ideas are articulated most clearly in the latest edition of The Creative City: A Toolkit for Urban Innovators (Charles landry (2009) London; Comedia/Earthscan). His earlier influential reports include The Art of Regeneration: urban renewal through cultural activity (Landry, C., Greene, L., Matarasso, F., and Bianchini, F., 1996; Stroud, Glos.: Comedia).
3. The creative city for a generation of cultural policy researchers was a cultural policy framework capable of addressing the ‘new’ post-industrial urban landscapes of the post-Fordist economy, along with new economic growth theory and propelled by notions of the new knowledge economy. There is a sense in which Landry’s work in the UK parallels economist Richard Florida in the USA, where creativity inserts human agency and imaginative subjectivity into general economic theory (Florida, R. (2002) The Rise of the Creative Class — and how it is transforming leisure, community and everyday life, New York: Basic Books). The other formative influence to creative city thinking is John Howkins (Howkins, J. (2001) The Creative Economy: How people make money from ideas, London: Penguin). The ‘non-academic’ way these three texts were written (as well as their empirical bent) was essential to their influence among urban policy makers.
4. The schemes were intended to raise large capital funding for major urban public projects, like schools, hospitals and roads, from private capital not public funds. However, the contractual arrangements heavily favoured the private contractors, many of which have been authorised to collect high returns on the projects for up to 25 years, near bankrupting the public organisations that were ‘partnered’. See, John Ware for Panorama, “Who’s Getting Rich On Your Money?” (BBC One, Monday, 28 November, 2011). See also George Montbiot (2005) ‘Our very own Enron’, The Guardian (28th June).
11. In British parliamentary process, the ‘White Paper’ (sometimes called ‘command paper’) follows a process of research and consultation (often tabulated in a Green Paper) and is the final government policy statement of intent. However, there is nothing in law that commits a government to enacting the terms of the statement.
13. In the DETR White Paper Tony Blair confirmed this shifting mind-set: ‘Success has been measured by economic growth – GDP – alone. We have failed to see how our economy, our environment and our society are all one. And that delivering the best quality of life for us all means more than concentrating solely on economic growth [...] we must ensure that economic growth contributes to our quality of life, rather than degrading it’: DETR (1999) A Better Quality of Life: A Strategy for Sustainable development for the United Kingdom, London: Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions/ Stationery Office: 3.
increased ‘power’, they became more and more subject to DCMS priorities and propelled by the ever-changing policy process.


24. This began in 2009-10 with the strategic framework Achieving Great Art for Everyone (London: Arts Council England) developed in 2009 and published 2010; the most recent publication furthering this theme is the Arts Council Plan 2011-15 (London: Arts Council England): http://www.artscouncil.org.uk/publication_archive/arts-council-plan-2011-15/: accessed 10/11/11. The theme of the intrinsic value of art is a consistent philosophical problem for cultural policy, animating the constant search for ‘public value’ that characterized New Labour’s politics, and threaten to remain their legacy. From the lobbying of the Social Inclusion Unit, the Urban Task Force, even Regional Cultural Consortia, the demand for a problem-focused approach to cultural funding reached an impasse in 2004 with culture Minister Tessa Jowell’s oddball policy essay, ‘Government and the Value of Culture’ (London: DCMS/Stationery Office). Arguing for an intrinsic value to culture (broadly, in the context of the European philosophical tradition), she effectively generated a ‘new humanism’ in cultural policy, which was broadly welcomed but remained little more than an enormous question mark. Sir Brian McMaster’s government report in 2008, went some way to articulating the policy function of this new humanism, where professional judgment was affirmed to be superior to impact measurement. The object of judgment was ‘excellence’, which ultimately raised another large question mark. See The McMaster Review: Supporting excellence in the arts – from measurement to judgment (London: DCMS). The problem of ‘value’ in cultural policy remains a chronic one, and most of the pre-Jowell bureaucratic demands for empirical measurement of impacts still remain at large.


